Proposed; unimplemented, with unresolved authority and qualification gates. The owner reopened the earlier held design on 2 October 2026 to explore a phone over a private network. Opus prepared revision 2; Fable supplied co-designer feedback, not reviewer-of-record approval. Neither the reopening nor this preservation adopts the proposed defaults.
The intended result
Routine requests would reach a small phone interface. The owner could inspect a bounded request, perform a provider's own ceremony and sign an exact grant. The proposed interface contains no model. Notifications reveal only that attention is needed; account details, provider text, codes and credential values stay out of notifications and general request lists.
Delegation on the provider's own page is the preferred route: a scoped credential, consent or device-code approval made by the owner for the intended caller. Cookie export and replay are rejected. Agents must not enter the owner's passwords, perform identity or bot checks, pay, extract OAuth credentials or repurpose an existing session. A recorded answer is attribution; it is not a signed grant or permission to act.
The proposed presence service would use its own operating-system identity and private-network node. The reason is to separate its address, port and policy from ordinary owner processes. This page does not commission a daemon, node, account, installation, policy rewrite or setting change.
Resolve these boundaries before building
| Gate | What remains unresolved |
|---|---|
| Existing network and Funnel | Revision 2 claimed the installed network variant could not run Funnel. Same-day co-designer observations reported Funnel already in use. Preserve this as a dated conflict, not a current host claim. Recheck with read-only evidence when commissioned, and decide the proposed node's policy separately from existing personal services. |
| Account ownership | Device sign-in and network administration may belong to different accounts. The owner must establish the correct authority for each change. This proposal carries no account identifier or implicit permission to use one. |
| Web versus native phone client | WebAuthn, push delivery and tunnel behaviour on the actual phone have not been proved. An explicit phone drill must establish the useful path before choosing the implementation; a native fallback has its own distribution and credential costs. |
| Signatures | Bind the relying party to the full presence-node hostname, not a shared parent domain. The broker must verify the exact allowed origin, user verification, signature and a fresh single-use challenge over the canonical grant and nonce. Test replay, substitution and local-origin attempts. |
| Enrolment and loss | Initial enrolment, removal, recovery and replacement need a separately reviewed owner ceremony. A synced passkey is not proof of possession by only one device. |
| Rotation and broker custody | Phone signing depends on reviewed OP7/HA6 integration. Brokered rotation also waits for Service access increment 9 and decision 8. The broker's token needs a started installation ceremony and fresh assertion, with no logs, echo or later retrievable page. |
| Redirects and device codes | Any loopback-redirect forwarding needs the original started client, single-use state, pinned origin and PKCE. Provider compatibility, callback handling and lost replies remain unproved; these are not generic sign-in capabilities. |
| Restart and remote access | Power recovery, disk protection and existing remote access are separate owner decisions. No historical machine snapshot authorises changing them. |
The remote-browser alternative is still open
Revision 2 proposed a Factory-owned Mac browser controlled from the phone. Fable recommended removing it: it adds session-bearing profiles and a browser maintenance burden, while the owner would type passwords into Factory-controlled memory without normal password-manager domain checks. The need and provider compatibility were not established.
An owner-driven remote session and agent-driven use of a signed-in profile are different authority decisions. The optional Q6(b) agent path remains outside the adopted service-access scope. It is not available merely because the owner is watching, a request was started or a lease amendment was proposed. Neither that option nor the feedback author's recommendation is adopted here. A future design must resolve it explicitly before implementation; owner credentials must not become agent-visible inputs.
Provenance and remaining proof
The source manifest identifies the unchanged original design (presence-v2), feedback (presence-feedback) and hold/reopening record (presence-hold) by hash. Private network observations and source paths stay in the local preservation record. This page preserves the useful proposal and its disagreements without presenting the dated host observations as current facts.
No phone, browser, provider, grant or rotation path has been qualified by this recovery. Independent design review, owner decisions, bounded fixtures and the relevant real-device/provider drills remain separate gates. The cloud proposal cannot use this unfinished signer to widen its authority.
