Import software-factory/delivery from an exact reviewed private tarball. It exposes the same authored Slice operations Factory calls. Importing starts no process, database, server, scheduler or provider.
Dependencies and authority
Use Node.js 26.8.1 or later on the qualified macOS arm64 host, the pinned Xcode Git binary and trusted single-host local storage. TypeScript consumers supply compatible Node declarations. There are no runtime npm dependencies. Storage is caller-owned; never place it on a network filesystem or inside a registered checkout.
Register the relevant Product through Portfolio in your own Journal. Registration identifies a primary checkout and permits metadata reads; it does not authorise changing that checkout. Delivery copies selected committed UTF-8 blobs to its own bare repository. Authored bootstrap files and later proposals are untrusted caller inputs. No unrelated Portfolio, Dashboard or provider state is required.
deliveryPaths(journal, root) only derives paths. Supply an existing journal and canonical absolute paths without whitespace; the private delivery root must be owned by the caller, mode 0700, and outside registered checkouts. Gate grants remain explicit and bounded. Installing or registering never grants production, release or model authority.
Independently callable stages
bindProduct(paths, input)binds one Product, committed source selection and owned target ref. Retain the original request; changed authored bytes, scope or target conflict on replay.grantAuthority(paths, input)grants only the named operations, paths and fixed limits;revokeAuthorityrecords revocation.planSlice(paths, input)freezes the Need, source/base, acceptance, recipe, environment, input snapshots, guidance and allowances. Inputs and acceptance belong to the commissioning host. Production cannot replace their pins.produceCandidate(paths, {productId, sliceRef, proposalPath})admits and seals an authored text-edit proposal. It returns a Candidate ID or a refusal, never a Verdict. There is no automatic worker or model dispatch.verifyCandidate(paths, {productId, sliceRef, candidate}, signal?)collects actual process Evidence and derives a repository Verdict against the independently owned frozen acceptance. Terminal replay re-derives the original proof with no new executor process; current validity remains separate from history.integrateCandidate(paths, {productId, sliceRef, candidate, proof, action, dispatchId})re-derives the proof, retains the original Action occurrence and dispatch ID, then guards one move of the owned bare ref. It records a sender receipt before the gate outcome. Unknown stays unknown; replay inspects the original intent and never submits another move.assessCandidate(paths, {productId, sliceRef, candidate, proof})derives the frozen measurements from the authentic proof. It reports support for the local Need and does not close a Slice or claim customer value.inspectDelivery(paths, {productId, sliceRef: string | null})reads retained gate, Slice, Candidate and Verdict metadata without dispatch.requestStopandclearStoptake caller-retained original ordinal and expected version. An uncertain retry repeats those exact fields; it cannot clear a later stop.
Factory checkout operators use the separate repository command guide. Installed callers use the typed stage APIs above.
The typed entry describes the complete inputs, output and bounds. The lower-level Repository, collector and executor guides retain their trust and platform limits.
Failures and recovery
DeliveryError distinguishes invalid input, missing records, conflicts, denied authority and unavailable resources; underlying gate, journal, repository and storage errors keep their own classifications. A result may be Verified, Failed, Inconclusive, invalidated, denied or exhausted. Known failure is never success. Missing or corrupt proof cannot be repaired by silently recreating records or repinning a Slice.
Planning, non-terminal production and new collection acquire the Product's existing fence. An unresolved predecessor check is reconciled under actual exclusion before a bounded later epoch. Duplicate calls spend no new allowance after terminal proof replay. Product roots isolate Candidate, snapshot, Evidence and executor storage. The same original allowance survives cancellation and restart.
Source and installed collectors have different resource protocols. Freeze each new Slice against the collector actually installed; an old source-mode Slice must not be relabelled or repinned to compiled resources. Candidate output cannot appoint an evaluator or create trusted Evidence. Trusted storage writers and loaders remain outside the integrity boundary.
This contract covers authored local repository work. Independently accepting a Candidate produced outside this owner, automatic Implementation workers, live models, customer releases and realised customer benefit require separate contracts and qualification. An installed consumer is local adoption evidence, not live release evidence.
