Scope: Bounded private subscriptions and verification challenges. Build review records accepted snapshots and current verification gates. No live MCP host, public connector or receiver is qualified; no application notification, replay, model job or domain command is sent.
- Source: public entry, neutral contract, private parser.
- Proof: focused boundaries, two-layout private caller, installed process/crash/signed receiver proof, distribution checks.
- Complete installed contract, reader guide, provider design, acceptance.
Intelligence: none — Subscriptions enforce scoped private lifecycle, current caller authority and bounded verification; a model cannot verify keys or grant callback contact.
Source closure and authority
software-factory/provider-subscriptions exposes ProviderSubscriptionHost, policy parsing/digest, wireError, limits and ES2024-only types. The local runtime closure is entry, private parser, neutral contract, EV1 entry/contract, strict-input, canonical-json and errors. Node builtins supply bytes, crypto, native Promise recognition and URL parsing. The module imports no Journal, Factory, provider SDK, HTTP client, process runner, environment or ambient clock. Import and constructor are passive.
The caller supplies a private transactional store, current local ACL authority under its actual shared lock, a connector that reopens current records at contact admission, clock and CSPRNG nonce. The runtime validates bounded frames/results and fixed protocol data; it cannot turn a dishonest caller port into an atomic store or a safe network connector. Missing/copy-derived/replaced state must refuse under an externally witnessed store identity. Keys and raw callbacks belong only in mutable private state and trusted ports, never immutable journals or diagnostics.
Fixed lifecycle
One Product/event profile is commissioned per instance. Static exact wire validation precedes private collaborators. Discovery denial yields an empty catalogue only for authenticated denial; unknown state is an error. Each fresh subscribe allocates a monotonic epoch and starts a finite TTL at pending admission. Current active/pending rows and fixed challenge/rate debits are reserved under the store-wide/ACL fence. A later current transaction activates only the exact still-authorised predecessor/epoch after a bounded 2xx signed challenge response.
Unknown slots survive timeout, expiry, row deletion, window ageing and restart. Actual terminal settlement may release them; a no-further-contact witness is caller-owned reconciliation, never elapsed time. A historical attempt token is passive and re-authorised, cannot renew a grant, and expires at its original retry horizon. Allocated epochs end at 1,000,000; nextEpoch 1,000,001 is only an exhausted sentinel. Reads and cleanup still work without allocation.
Verification cache binds principal, canonical URL/key digest and current non-reused permission generation. Cache reuse never extends the verification observation. Key rotation preserves the original predecessor grant and bounds overlap once; another key during overlap refuses. Maintenance is explicit even while quiet, removes at most 32 due records per call and must drain within commissioned retention. Overdue cleanup refuses new work. Raw data deletion does not claim JavaScript/backup secure erasure.
Retained committed subscribe receipts are checked against natural identity, attempt/policy grant bounds and their exact epoch row while present. A narrowed public refusal is accepted by wireError; unknown extra fields still refuse.
The installed guide owns exact wire shapes, errors, bounds and caller obligations. Existing EV1 projection/history, D4, Knowledge and all earlier receipts remain unchanged. The original component review records its historical source/artefact; the current component reviews pin the three corrections. Combined package/public acceptance passed and the component was accepted locally on 1 October 2026; CI remains required; test-only loopback verification is not production DNS/TLS/redirect qualification.
Native-data observation is separate from validation. Native Promise values under string or symbol data descriptors, including byte-view metadata, discarded late store results and malformed clock/nonce/store/connector returns, are observed while forbidden JSON remains refused; getters and user then methods are not invoked. Strict child-process proof covers refusal and uncertainty cases through two real private-store layouts, read/static refusals and a corrupted acknowledgement after a pending subscription commit. The latter retains the original uncertain attempt and starts no callback. Historical receipts and the previous accepted component remain unchanged.
